OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials 2026

Monitoring the Use of Export Restrictions Amidst Growing Market and Policy Tensions

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OECD

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MONITORING THE USE OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AMIDST GROWING MARKET AND POLICY TENSIONS

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1 International trade in critical raw materials and export restrictions

Key messages

- Export restrictions on critical raw materials have increased fivefold since 2009. Growth tapered in 2024 to a 0.6% annual growth rate but restrictions remain at historically high levels following the sharp rise in 2022-2023.
- New export restrictions introduced in 2024 were implemented by a more diverse group of countries than in previous years, pointing to broader adoption of such measures among resource-rich developing economies, particularly in Africa and Asia.
- Several materials critical to industrial and energy-transition supply chains—including cobalt, manganese, graphite and rare-earth elements—face particularly high exposure to export restrictions: around 70% of global exports of cobalt and manganese were subject to at least one export restriction in 2022-2024. Similarly high levels of exposure were also observed for graphite (47%), rare-earth elements (45%), and tin (41%).
- The materials that saw the largest increases in export restrictions in 2024 included tantalum, lithium, tin, manganese, nickel, cobalt and several non-ferrous minor metals, including vanadium and niobium. The growth rate of export restrictions on niobium, tantalum, vanadium and lithium exceeded 10%.
- The share of CRM imports facing at least one restriction increased globally from 12.4% in the 2009-2011 period to 16% in the 2022-2024 period. Within the OECD, the EU and Japan saw reductions in their exposure over the observation period, but Japan's exposure remains above the global average, with 18.4% of its CRM imports covered by export restrictions. Other OECD members with above global average exposure are the United Kingdom (22.7%) and Korea (21.8%).
- Export taxes and licensing requirements remain the most widely used export restriction instruments, but the most severe type of restrictions—such as export prohibitions—have become more common. In 2024, close to one quarter of newly introduced restrictions took the form of export prohibitions while licensing requirements, which in their most restrictive forms can have effects similar to prohibitions, accounted for 38% of the new measures.

Raw materials such as lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel or tungsten are essential to security and prosperity, playing a critical role in energy and digital transitions, and expanding defence capabilities. They are also used intensively in the manufacturing of semiconductors, advanced electronics, fibre optics, superalloys, permanent magnets, aerospace and other technologically advanced industries.

Demand for such critical raw materials (CRMs) is rising rapidly. However, supply is slow to adjust, and extraction and processing remain highly geographically and ownership-concentrated. Although the leading producers differ by material, the top three countries for each of cobalt, lithium and nickel account for over two-thirds of global production, rising to nearly 90% for rare-earth elements. The People's Republic of China (hereafter, China) alone produces around 70% of global supply of rare-earth elements and graphite and more than 90% of germanium and magnesium.

Some CRMs, notably battery minerals, have seen significant supply increases in recent years but these increases have often been concentrated among major incumbent miners and refiners—particularly those in or owned by China—reinforcing supply concentration and driving price volatility (IEA, 2025[1]). Despite strong expectations for future demand growth, investment in mining and refining capacity expansion has stalled amid market and economic uncertainties. Recently announced projects are deemed unlikely to meaningfully diversify mineral supply in the foreseeable future (IEA, 2025[1]).

In this context, the persistent concentration of CRM mining and processing, and the growing use of export restrictions on CRMs documented in the OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]), are increasingly viewed as threats to economic and national security in importing industrialised countries. Understanding—and proposing viable ways to counter—the growing use of such trade restrictions and other trade-distorting interventions in the CRM sector has thus become a significant systemic challenge.

While export restrictions take many forms and pursue diverse objectives (e.g., promoting domestic processing, protecting the environment, attracting investment, and raising public revenue) their effectiveness in achieving sustainable development goals remains contested. Moreover, restrictions—especially those imposed by major producers—can have significant negative spillovers on trading partners and often trigger similar actions by others, creating a cycle of rising prices and tightening global supply.

In response to these challenges, OECD Member countries are undertaking new policy initiatives to scale up high-quality investment in more diversified mining, processing and recycling capacity and to ensure a level playing field in the CRM industry – including through internationally agreed export credit rules[1] and the signature of new international co-operation agreements in this area.[2]

Compiled since 2009, the OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]) provides a key evidence base on the global use of export restrictions and their effects, and informs the design of these policy responses. The inventory is updated annually and provides detailed data on the incidence, type, scope and evolution of export restrictions across countries and products. The current update covers 2009-2024.

2 Key trends in the use of export restrictions up to 2024

Between 2009 and 2024, export restrictions on CRMs increased fivefold. The most significant rises occurred in the early 2010s, when the OECD began regularly collecting data and monitoring these measures amid growing policy tensions following the 2010-11 episode of economic coercion involving China's rare earths exports to Japan.[3]

Figure 2.1. Export restrictions increased fivefold over 2009-2024

Number of exported raw material products subject to at least one export restriction measure



Note: This figure compiles all types of measures in place across all covered raw materials and all implementing countries. It takes into account the stock of measures in place at the beginning of the period, as well as new measures implemented since and discontinued measures.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

Key insights on export restrictions adopted in 2024

Though the number of export restrictions in place increased fivefold over the past 15 years, in 2024, the overall number of export restrictions was only marginally higher than the previous year's, marking an annual growth rate of 0.6%. This contrasts with the growth rate of 3.4% registered in 2023 and is closer to the 2021 (+0.6%) and 2022 (+0.8%) growth rates.

A partial normalisation of conditions in several mineral markets may explain the deceleration of the pace of growth of export restrictions imposed in 2024. The stronger uptake observed in 2022-2023 coincided with a sharp increase in raw material and energy prices following the Russian Federation's (hereafter, Russia) invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Figure 2.2), as well as heightened geopolitical tensions. In 2024, several of these tensions eased.

Figure 2.2. Raw materials saw a significant spike in price in 2022 and 2023, followed by normalisation in 2024

Monthly prices of selected raw materials, index 2015=100



Source: IMF's Primary Commodity Price System (IMF, 2026[3]).

Over the full sample period of the Inventory (2009-2024), India, China, Argentina, Viet Nam, and Burundi ranked among the top five countries by number of new export restrictions introduced, together accounting for over half of all measures implemented during this period (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. Five countries accounted for more than half of the new restrictions on raw minerals introduced over 2009-2024

Country shares in the increase in the total number of export restriction measures between 2009 and 2024



Note: Data refer to net additions in the period 01 January 2009 to 27 December 2024 (and not 31 December 2024), to account for the fact that some countries require by law that certain measures introduced during the course of the year be withdrawn on the last day of the year and reinstated on the first day of the following year. Country abbreviations: ARG-Argentina; BDI-Burundi; CHN-China (People's Republic of); COD-Democratic Republic of the Congo; EGY-Egypt; ETH-Ethiopia; GAB-Gabon; IDN-Indonesia; IND-India; MMR-Myanmar; MNG-Mongolia; SAU-Saudi Arabia; SEN-Senegal; UKR-Ukraine; VNM-Viet Nam; ZMB-Zambia.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

Yet, the export restrictions adopted in 2024 were imposed by a more geographically diverse set of countries than in previous years. In 2024, several resource-rich economies in Africa and Central Asia contributed to the increase. Myanmar accounted for the largest share of newly affected products (21.7%), followed by Sierra Leone (14.2%) and Nigeria (12.8%). Other notable contributors included Angola, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Rwanda and Argentina (Figure 2.4). [4]

Figure 2.4. A diverse group of countries contributed to the introduction of new export restrictions on raw materials in 2024

Countries with largest net additions of new measures in 2024



Note: Data refer to net additions in the period 31 December 2023 to 30 December 2024 to account for the fact that some countries require by law that certain measures introduced during the course of the year be withdrawn on the last day of the year and reinstated on the first day of the following year. Country abbreviations: AGO-Angola; ARE-United Arab Emirates; ARG-Argentina; BLR-Belarus; CHN-China (People's Republic of); EGY-Egypt; IDN-Indonesia; JOR-Jordan; KAZ-Kazakhstan; KGZ-Kyrgyzstan; MMR-Myanmar; NGA-Nigeria; PHL-Philippines; RUS-Russia; RWA-Rwanda; SLE-Sierra Leone; THA-Thailand; UKR-Ukraine; UZB-Uzbekistan; VNM-Viet Nam; ZWE-Zimbabwe.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

In several countries, the introduction of new measures in 2024 primarily took the form of export or fiscal taxes[5] applied across a broad range of raw materials (see also Figure 2.11). For example, Myanmar introduced price-contingent tax rates across multiple products, including wood products, manganese, nickel, tin, antimony and rare-earth elements, as well as waste and scrap materials. Sierra Leone introduced fiscal taxes on exports targeting titanium, zirconium, germanium and manganese, while Rwanda implemented export taxes on several base metals in raw form, including tin and tungsten.

Other countries relied more extensively on licensing requirements or quantitative restrictions. Nigeria introduced licensing requirements covering niobium, tantalum and vanadium products, as well as waste and scrap materials. Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic introduced export prohibitions affecting metal waste and scrap products, while Angola introduced a temporary export quota on ferrous and non-ferrous metal waste.

Several measures introduced or extended in 2024 also targeted upstream segments of mineral supply chains, like ores and concentrates, as well as waste and scrap, with waste and scrap representing an important source of recoverable minerals through recycling. Argentina introduced licensing requirements on copper ores and various metal waste products, while the United Arab Emirates implemented export taxes on scrap metals including iron, steel, copper and aluminium. Other measures focused on specific upstream materials, such as Zimbabwe's export tax on lithium compounds and Viet Nam's revised export taxes on titanium ores and concentrates and unwrought tin.

Finally, in some cases, governments reintroduced or extended existing export restrictions. Ukraine reintroduced export quotas and licensing requirements on coking coal and precious-metal scrap, while Belarus reinstated temporary export prohibitions on certain metal waste products. Egypt and the Philippines extended temporary export tax regimes covering minerals and wood products.

At the same time, a number of previously existing export restrictions were removed or allowed to expire in 2024. These removals partly offset the introduction of new measures and help explain the relative stabilisation in the overall number of export restrictions observed in 2024. For example, Argentina discontinued its export prohibition regime on waste and scrap of iron and steel and removed a licensing requirement on several waste and scrap products. In other cases, governments revised existing frameworks, such as China's VAT rebates on copper and aluminium products.

Breaking down changes in the incidence of export restrictions by material shows that products such as tantalum, lithium, tin, manganese, nickel, cobalt and several non-ferrous minor metals including vanadium and niobium, recorded some of the highest increases in 2024 relative to 2023 (Figure 2.5). By contrast, aluminium, magnesium and fluorspar are among the materials that experienced greater liberalisation over the same period.

Figure 2.5. For some materials the global incidence of export restrictions increased by more than 10%

Increase factor for the scaled incidence of export restrictions* between 2023 and 2024



Note: *The scaled incidence is the number of export restrictions recorded for the product divided by the number of Harmonized System codes that describe that product. Increase factor = scaled count of measures in place in December 2024 / scaled count of measures in place in January 2023. Products are ordered by increase factor between 2023 and 2024. Only products with the increase factor above 1 are shown.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

Key facts on export restrictions adopted over 2009-2024

Waste and scrap products continue to face the highest incidence of export restrictions across all categories of industrial raw materials. This reflects both environmental concerns related to their export for disposal, and increasing interest in leveraging the circular economy as a source of supply for certain metals and minerals (Figure 2.6).

Over the period 2009-2024, export restrictions on ores and minerals—the raw materials located upstream in critical raw material supply chains—increased more rapidly than those in other segments of the supply chain. They increased nearly twice as fast as restrictions on materials such as metals or chemical compounds, which are more refined forms of CRMs (centre panel of Figure 2.6). This trend correlates with the high and increasing concentration of production, imports, and exports in the upstream segments of the supply chain.[6] It is also broadly aligned with the policy rationale of supporting domestic downstream industries through limits on upstream exports.

Figure 2.6. Export restrictions on ores and minerals increased more rapidly than those in other segments of the CRM supply chain

Initial scaled incidence (per Harmonised System code) of export restrictions by sector, increase factor, and current scaled incidence



Note: The scaled incidence is the number of export restrictions recorded for the product divided by the number of Harmonized System codes that describe that product category. Products are ordered by the scaled incidence in 2024. Increase factor = scaled count of measures in place in December 2024 / scaled count of measures in place in January 2009.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

At a more detailed product level, and over this larger sample period, the materials that saw the largest increase in export restrictions include unprocessed or marginally processed forms of molybdenum, potash, tungsten, zirconium, and germanium (Figure 2.7). By contrast, for ores of copper, aluminium and tin, for example, the adoption of new export restrictions was rarer.[7]

Figure 2.7. Some raw materials have experienced a sharp increase in export restrictions

Initial scaled incidence (per HS code) of export restrictions by product-sector*, increase factor**, and current scaled incidence



Notes: *All specific HS6 raw material products are classified into the following "sectors" which aim to capture the different stages of processing or types of products: precious metals and stones (PM), ores and minerals (OM), chemical compounds (CC), non-ferrous minor metals (NFMM), non-ferrous base metals (NFBM), waste and scrap (WS), ferrous metals (FM).
**Only non-waste and scrap sectors with above average (5.14) increase factors for the period 2009-2024 are shown.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

The global share of CRM trade covered by these measures also rose markedly in the 2009-2024 period. Between 2022 and 2024, on average, approximately 16% of global trade in raw materials was subject to at least one export restriction measure, compared with 12.4% in the 2009-2011 period. These averages mask substantial variation across products; for instance, around 70% of global exports of cobalt and manganese were subject to at least one export restriction in 2022-2024. Similarly high levels of exposure were also observed for graphite (47%), rare-earth elements (45%), and tin (41%) (Figure 2.8).

For some minerals, the high share of trade covered reflects stronger adoption of restrictions compared with 2009-2011. This is the case for cobalt, nickel, iron and steel, molybdenum, and precious metal ores

and concentrates. For other minerals, like natural graphite, rare-earth elements, palladium and platinum, the share of mineral trade covered by export restrictions remained high, as it already was in 2009-2011.[8]

Figure 2.8. More than 20% of trade in certain key minerals faced at least one export restriction over 2022-2024

Share in global exports of a given mineral (%) facing at least one export restriction



Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]) and BACI database.

When trade subject to at least one export restriction is expressed as a share of a country's total CRM imports, it becomes clear that some countries face far more restrictions than others. For some countries, this share increased between 2009-2011 and 2022-2024, reflecting both the growing incidence of restrictions and shifts in sourcing patterns toward suppliers applying such measures. In other cases, exposure declined due to reduced reliance on restricted sources or from suppliers easing their restrictions (Figure 2.9). In the most recent period of 2022-24, exposure was especially pronounced for some industrialised importers such as the United Kingdom, Korea and Japan while it was somewhat lower for larger and more diversified importers such as the United States and the European Union.

Figure 2.9. Some countries source a significant share of raw materials from countries imposing export restrictions

Share of imports facing at least one restriction by country in percentages



Note: Calculation based on the value of imports in USD.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]) and BACI database.

With respect to the type of export restrictions adopted, export taxes and licensing requirements contributed most to the growth of the global stock of export restrictions between 2009 and 2024. They were also the two most frequently used restriction types in 2024. This aligns with the fact that, under WTO rules, quantitative export restrictions are generally prohibited, whereas export taxes and licensing requirements are allowed under certain conditions.[9]

In this context it is striking that the use of export prohibitions—the most restrictive measures—increased sharply after 2019 (Figure 2.10), although their use declined somewhat in 2024, possibly in response to falling CRM prices. Still, in 2024, export prohibitions accounted for about one-quarter of newly introduced measures, with export quotas adding another 12% (Figure 2.11).

Figure 2.10. While licensing requirements and export taxes are the most common measures, export prohibitions have increased in recent years

Number of countries applying at least one export restriction by type over time



Note: The export taxes category includes export taxes, export surtaxes, and fiscal taxes on exports.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

Revenue generation has been the fastest-growing officially stated rationale for export restrictions since the early 2010s.[10] In 2024, it was the most cited reason on record, accounting for over 47% of newly introduced measures.

Figure 2.11. Licensing requirements and exports taxes were the most commonly introduced measures in 2023-2024

Type of new measures introduced in 2023 and 2024



Note: The export taxes category includes export taxes, export surtaxes, and fiscal taxes on exports.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

At the same time, several industrial policy objectives—such as safeguarding domestic supply, promoting further processing and value addition, and protecting local downstream industries—appeared frequently since the early 2010s, although in 2024 these objectives were cited less often than in previous years.

Rationales related to monitoring and controlling export activity, including natural resource conservation, have declined somewhat since 2009 but, in 2024, they remained relatively stable compared with recent years (Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12. Generating government revenue is the fastest growing officially stated purpose of export restrictions and the most stated purpose of restrictions introduced in 2024

Principal purpose of measures introduced (when the purpose is stated)



Note: "Industrial policy" covers the following sub-categories of stated purposes: "Safeguard domestic supply", "Product is strategic for the economy", "Promote further processing / value added"; "Protect local downstream industry"; "Control" covers the following sub-categories of stated purposes: "Monitoring / control of export activity" and "Conservation of natural resources".
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).

3 Implications

Importing industrialised countries increasingly perceive risks to their economic security arising from two factors: (1) the persistent geographical concentration of mining and processing of CRMs, and (2) the growing use of export restrictions on CRMs that are essential for the energy and digital transitions, as well as for defence and advanced manufacturing. Stringent restrictions, especially by major producers, can trigger similar actions by others and drive up prices while tightening global supply. Together with other non-market policies and practices, export restrictions pose significant risks to supply chain resilience.

In response, OECD Member countries are launching new policies and initiatives—like the modernisation of the OECD Export Credit Arrangement and the conclusion of tailored bilateral or plurilateral arrangements—to boost investment in more diversified mining, processing, and recycling capacity, and to ensure a level playing field in the CRM industry. The OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials provides a crucial evidence base on global export restrictions and their impacts, guiding the design of policy responses.

Key findings from the latest update include:

- *Long-term rise in export restrictions*: Between 2009 and 2024, export restrictions on critical raw materials increased fivefold. The largest jumps were early in the period, though 2022-2023 also saw rapid increases, coinciding with a spike in raw material and energy prices after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and heightened geopolitical tensions. After a price decline, growth in restrictions slowed in 2024, appearing to temporarily stabilise at historically high levels.
- *Market-linked fluctuations*: These shifts track sharp swings in raw material prices and geopolitical tensions, highlighting the connection between market pressures and policy interventions in raw material markets.
- *Focus on strategic CRMs*: Key minerals for industrial production and the energy transition—cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare-earth elements—face high exposure to export restrictions.
- *Significant shares of trade affected*: Between 2022 and 2024, an average of approximately 16% of global trade in critical raw materials was subject to restrictions, with cobalt (67%), manganese (66%), natural graphite (47%), and rare-earth elements (45%) being the most affected.
- *The most restrictive type of restrictions is becoming more common*: Export taxes and licensing remain dominant but the most restrictive type of restrictions—such as export prohibitions—have become increasingly common since the late 2010s, accounting for more than one-quarter of all measures introduced in 2024.
- *Revenue and industrial policy motives rising*: Objectives such as generating public revenue and safeguarding domestic supply, boosting processing and value addition, and protecting local downstream industries have been the fastest-growing stated rationales for export restrictions since the early 2010s.

4 About the OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials

Gathering evidence on the use of export restrictions is fundamental to analysing their economic and non-economic effects, and for motivating and informing international co-operation. The OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials aims to improve transparency and to build an inventory of border and domestic measures that restrict the export of critical raw materials. The Inventory is a rich source of qualitative and quantitative information on different types of export restrictions introduced (or withdrawn) by the main exporters of critical raw materials. It is a public good that provides data for empirical analysis to advance understanding of the economic and non-economic effects of these export restrictions. The Inventory can be used to assess whether and how export restrictions may be contributing to shortages and high prices of raw materials, as well as how policy reforms may ease tensions and help ensure the secure and efficient supply of raw materials for all.[11]

Data sources collection process

Information on export restrictions is collected from official websites and documents issued by governments of the key producing countries. These include ministries in charge of the economy, trade, industry, mining, forestry, or foreign affairs, as well as customs agencies. Sources of information on policies that restrict exports include legal acts, rules, regulations, public notices, circulars, and notifications by ministries published on their websites. Secondary sources, such as news articles, are also used to identify export measures applied by a country or changes made to measures during the survey year. That said, only measures that can be substantiated from official sources are entered into the inventory.

Product coverage

The Inventory covers 65 industrial commodities, including 58 minerals and metals, six wood products, and all metallic waste and scrap from minerals and metals covered in the Inventory (Table 4.1). Export restrictions are recorded in the inventory for products classified in the Harmonised System 2007 nomenclature at the 6-digit level (HS6), which currently covers 489 products.

Table 4.1. Products covered in the Inventory

Minerals and metals				
Aluminium	Antimony	Arsenic	Barytes	Bentonite
Beryllium	Bismuth	Borates	Cadmium	Chromium
Cobalt	Coke	Coking coal	Copper	Diamonds
Diatomite	Feldspar	Fluorspar	Gallium	Garnet
Germanium	Gold	Natural graphite	Gypsum	Indium
Iron and steel	Kaolin	Lead	Limestone	Lithium
Magnesite	Magnesium	Manganese	Mercury	Molybdenum
Nickel	Niobium	Perlite	Phosphates	Pig iron
Platinum group metals (PGMs)[1]	Potash	Rare earths (REE)	Rhenium	Selenium
Silica	Silicon	Silver	Strontium	Talc
Tantalum	Tellurium	Tin	Titanium	Tungsten
Vanadium	Zinc	Zirconium		

Wood	
Industrial roundwood coniferous	Sawnwood coniferous
Industrial roundwood non-coniferous non-tropical	Sawnwood non-coniferous non-tropical
Industrial roundwood non-coniferous tropical	Sawnwood non-coniferous tropical

Other
Metal waste and scrap for all metals and minerals included in the Inventory

Note: [1] Platinum group metals (PGM) includes platinum, palladium, and all other PMG metals (rhodium, iridium, osmium and ruthenium).
Source: OECD (2026[4]).

Country coverage

All countries accounting for at least 3% of global production of any of the covered materials or which were among the top five producers of any of products covered are included in the Inventory. Eighty countries producing industrial raw material commodities are currently surveyed. These countries accounted for 97% of the world production of minerals and metals, and 81% of world production of wood in 2022. This coverage essentially allows for the monitoring of export restrictions by all significant raw materials producers worldwide.

Table 4.2. Countries covered in the Inventory

Angola	Argentina	Australia	Austria (EU)
Belarus	Belgium (EU)	Bolivia	Botswana
Brazil	Bulgaria (EU)	Burundi	Canada
Chile	China (People's Republic of)	Colombia	Czechia (EU)
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Denmark (EU)	Egypt	Ethiopia
Finland (EU)	France (EU)	Gabon	Germany (EU)
Ghana	Greece (EU)	Guatemala	Guinea
Hungary (EU)	India	Indonesia	Ireland (EU)
Israel	Italy (EU)	Jamaica	Japan
Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Korea

Kyrgyzstan	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Madagascar	Malaysia
Mexico	Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique
Myanmar	Namibia	Netherlands	New Caledonia (France)
Nigeria	Norway	Oman	Peru
Philippines	Poland (EU)	Portugal (EU)	Qatar
Romania (EU)	Russia	Rwanda	Saudi Arabia
Senegal	Sierra Leone	Slovakia (EU)	South Africa
Spain (EU)	Sweden (EU)	Tajikistan	Thailand
Tunisia	Türkiye	Ukraine	United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom	United States	Uzbekistan	Viet Nam
Zambia	Zimbabwe		

Source: OECD (2026[4]).

Types of measures covered

The Inventory records measures known or suspected to restrain export activity. These measures typically increase the relative price of exported products, decrease the quantity supplied, or change the terms of competition amongst suppliers. The list of surveyed measures includes export taxes, prohibitions, non-automatic licensing requirements, and any other export restricting measure (able 4.3).

The Inventory excludes export controls that have been implemented to comply with international conventions and agreements that limit the trade of certain goods,[12] or measures implemented to control exports of dual-use items.[13] Only export restrictions that are applied to all trading partners are covered in the Inventory.[14]

Table 4.3. Measures restricting exports included in the Inventory

Export restriction	Definition
Export tax	A tax collected on goods or commodities at the time they leave a customs territory. This tax can be set either on a *per unit* basis or an *ad valorem* (percentage of value) basis. Other terms equivalent to export tax are also covered: *export tariff, export duty, export levy, export charge*.
Fiscal tax on exports	A tax not paid at the border, but which applies only to, or discriminates against, goods or commodities intended for export. An example is when the *sales tax* which a government charges is higher for goods or commodities intended for export than when these goods or commodities are offered for sale in the domestic market. Another term equivalent to fiscal tax on exports that is also covered: *export royalty*.
Export surtax	A tax collected on goods or commodities at the time they leave a customs territory, and which is applied in addition to the normal export tax rate. These can be part of a progressive tax system or can be adapted to price trends and can thus be of a temporary nature. Example: a USD 10 surcharge is applied on each tonne of a commodity exported when the world price of this commodity exceeds USD 1 800 a tonne. Other terms equivalent to export surtax that are also covered: *export surcharge*.
Export quota	A prescribed maximum volume of permitted exports.
Export prohibition	No exports are permitted. Exceptions may be granted through export licences. Other terms equivalent to export prohibition that are also covered: *export ban, export embargo*.
Licensing requirement (including non-automatic)	Exporters must obtain prior approval, in form of a license, to export a good or commodity. This practice requires submission of an application or other documentation as a condition for being authorised to export. Although export licensing regimes may vary in their impact on exports, even those regimes that have a relatively limited economic impact, nonetheless increase the amount of time needed to engage in trade. Licensing schemes can operate on the basis of product lists of various types, usually lists of restricted products that require licences be applied to restrict exports by destination (e.g., specific countries) or that have other conditions attached, such as a requirement that exportation may only be for a specified purpose. Other terms equivalent to non-automatic licensing that are also covered: *export permit*.

Export restriction	Definition
Minimum export price/reference price for exports	The minimum allowable price for a good being exported. This practice is often used in conjunction with export taxes in order to prevent under-invoicing and can be used as a base to calculate export taxes. In some cases, minimum export prices are not binding but are used as reference prices. Other terms equivalent to minimum export price that are also covered: *administered pricing*.
VAT tax rebate reduction / withdrawal	Most countries with a VAT system will rebate the VAT on exports. By denying VAT reimbursement in whole or part, it is relatively less advantageous to export a product than to sell it domestically. This measure is usually used to encourage downstream local production of products that use the raw material input. A variant that is also covered is the removal or reduction of rebate from *other sales taxes* on exports of a product.
Restriction on customs clearance point for exports	The government specifies the ports or customs offices through which the export of a good or commodity must be channelled.
Qualified exporters list	The right to export a certain commodity is granted to specific companies by the government through a process of application and registration.
Domestic market obligation	The requirement for producers to allocate a proportion of their annual production output for sale in the domestic market. Domestic market obligations are sometimes part of production-sharing contracts or contracts allowing extraction by foreign firms.
Captive mining	When a processing company is required to own the mine that produces its inputs, or has been awarded sole mining rights with the intention that it will mine the commodity for use in its own domestic production processes and not trade it. Captive mining is a form of government support for firms with access to captive supplies, as well as a means to control the price and availability of a commodity in global markets. When captive mining concessions increase (as a share of production), exports of the relevant commodity are likely to fall.
Other export measures	Measures not elsewhere specified, but which influence *de jure* or *de facto* the level or direction of exports of industrial raw materials.

Source: OECD (2026[4]).

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Notes

[1] For example, the modernisation of the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits in July 2023 is a step forward in this direction. It allows financing under the Arrangement to be more flexible, better enabling it to face challenges posed by the economic and financial needs of projects—as well as the increasingly competitive landscape—and creates further incentives to support a wider range of climate-friendly transactions, including projects related to clean energy and ores.

[2] Several OECD members are also developing various forms of co-operation in the sphere of CRMs with resource-rich countries to mobilise investment and secure stable supply of CRMs as reflected in the proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral agreements. These agreements typically address both the security of CRM supply from the perspective of buying countries (typically framed in terms of supporting economic security and level playing field and energy transition and security) and the developmental objectives of supplying countries (typically framed as local economic development, value addition, technology transfer, as well as employment and investment in line with high ESG standards).

[3] See e.g. (OECD, 2024[6]).

[4] These statistics refer to net additions in the period 31 December 2023 to 27 December 2024. This allows to capture measures that are introduced during the course of the year and then withdrawn on the last day of the year – before being reinstated in the first day of the following year – which is a common practice in several jurisdictions.

[5] An export tax is a tax collected on goods or commodities when they leave a customs territory. A fiscal export tax refers to a tax that is not levied at the border but applies exclusively to, or discriminates against, goods or commodities intended for export.

[6] For more information, see Kowalski and Legendre (2023[5]).

[7]To focus on specific materials, calculations in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 exclude waste and scrap products, which is a separate aggregated category.

[8] Two things can explain changes in the global incidence of export restrictions as a share of affected trade. The first is that trade flows grow from exporters that have export restrictions in place, meaning that a greater share of global trade is covered by these measures. The second is that trade not formerly subject to export restrictions is targeted by new measures. By the same token, decreases tend to result from a shift away from trade flows with high restriction incidence, or a decline in restrictions affecting existing flows.

[9] As stipulated by Article VIII of the GATT, the allowed measures must not cause unjustifiable trade distortions.

[10] Based on measures where information on the officially stated purpose of export restrictions is available.

[11] See, for example, Kowalski and Legendre (2023[5]).

[12] These include measure such as the Kimberley Process for conflict diamonds; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) for some wood products; the Rotterdam Convention with regard to some chemical products; and the Basel Convention regarding metallic waste and scrap.

[13] Dual-use items are goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications.

[14] Export controls implemented on a bilateral basis (e.g. sanctions) are not included in the Inventory.

In this series

OECD (2025), *OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025: Monitoring the Use of Export Restrictions Amid Growing Market and Policy Tensions*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/facc714b-en.

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OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials 2026

Monitoring the Use of Export Restrictions Amidst Growing Market and Policy Tensions

Critical Raw Materials (CRMs) are essential to economic security and prosperity, but export restrictions are undermining their stable supply. The OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials provides a key evidence base on the global use of a diverse set of measures, ranging from licensing requirements to export prohibitions. The latest update shows that restrictions remain at historically high levels following sharp increases in 2022–2023. New export restrictions introduced in 2024 were implemented by a more diverse group of countries than in previous years, particularly in Africa and Asia. Restrictions cover up to 70% of global exports of cobalt and manganese, 47% of graphite exports and 45% of rare earth elements. By tightening supply and increasing price volatility, restrictions risk amplifying concentration and market distortions. International cooperation therefore remains essential to boost investment and ensure stable and more diversified supply in global markets.

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